Nudge the judge? Theorising the interaction between heuristics, sentencing guidelines and sentence clustering by Marder, ID & Pina-Sánchez, J
This is a repository copy of Nudge the judge? Theorising the interaction between 
heuristics, sentencing guidelines and sentence clustering.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/138719/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Marder, I and Pina Sanchez, J orcid.org/0000-0002-9416-6022 (Accepted: 2018) Nudge 
the judge? Theorising the interaction between heuristics, sentencing guidelines and 
sentence clustering. Criminology and Criminal Justice. ISSN 1748-8958 (In Press) 
This paper is protected by copyright. This is an author produced version of a paper 
accepted for publication in Criminology and Criminal Justice. Reprinted by permission of 
SAGE Publications. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Nudge the judge? Theorising the interaction between heuristics, sentencing 
guidelines and sentence clustering 
 
Abstract 
Although it has long been acknowledged that heuristics influence judicial decision-
making, researchers have yet to explore how sentencing guidelines might interact with 
heuristics to shape sentencing decisions. This article contributes to addressing this gap in 
the literature in three ways: firstly, by considering how heuristics might help produce the 
phenomenon of sentence clustering, in which a significant proportion of sentences are 
concentrated around a small number of outcomes; secondly, by reflecting on the role of 
sentencing guidelines as a feature of the environment within which sentencing decisions 
are made; and thirdly, by analysing the guidelines from Minnesota and from England and 
Wales, theorising how their content might interact with heuristics to make clustering more 
or less likely. Ultimately, we argue that sentencing guidelines likely affect the role played 
by heuristics in shaping sentencing decisions and, consequently, that their design should 
be informed by research evidence from the decision sciences. 
 
Key words: Sentencing; judicial decision-making; sentencing guidelines; heuristics; 
sentence clustering; choice architecture; nudge theory 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sentencing is a complex cognitive task. Judges are required to recognise 
differences between offenders and between criminal cases, to identify and assign weight 
to a variety of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and to select a sentence outcome 
from a wide range of available options (Ashworth, 2015), all while trying to reconcile 
several (often conflicting) principles and goals (Dhami, et al., 2015). We expect judges 
both to utilise a consistent decision-making process and to sentence offenders in 
accordance with HDFK FDVH¶V XQLTXH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV (Pina-Sánchez, 2015). However, 
empirical research consistently unearths evidence of sentence clustering, whereby terms 
of imprisonment are clustered around a small number of specific sentences (e.g. six, 
twelve or eighteen months) (Bottomley and Pease, 1986; Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986; 
Jones and Rankin, 2015; Roberts, et al., 2018). This is problematic, insofar as it indicates 
that judges may be treating offences of different seriousness and offenders of varying 
culpability in a uniform manner, undermining the principle of individualisation. Although 
sentence clustering is a well-documented phenomenon, researchers have yet to develop 
sufficient theoretically- and empirically-informed hypotheses as to why it exists (Roberts, 
et al., 2018).  
This article argues that we should draw on research from the decision sciences in 
order to help explain why sentence clustering occurs and how individualisation and other 
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normative goals might be promoted within sentencing. Specifically, we consider the 
possible role of heuristics ± a group of cognitive shortcuts which humans use to make 
decisions (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008) ± in causing sentence clustering. We also 
examine sentencing guidelines in order to hypothesise how they might exacerbate or 
mitigate the phenomenon of clustering, depending on how their content interacts with 
MXGJHV¶KHXULVWLFVGXULQJWKHVHQWHQFLQJSURFess. Dhami (2013a, 2013b) has observed that 
the design of sentencing guidelines is insufficiently informed by the psychology of 
decision making. By investigating one of the hitherto neglected dimensions of this 
complex policy area, we seek to add to the literature on how guidelines might aid 
sentencers in refining their decision-making processes.  
This paper begins by explaining what heuristics are and exploring how they might 
contribute to sentence clustering. It then proposes that guidelines are increasingly a 
feature of the environment in which sentencing decisions are made, forming part of the 
µFKRLFH DUFKLWHFWXUH¶ 7KDOHU DQG6XQVWHLQ RI VHQWHQFLQJ in jurisdictions where 
they are in force. Next, the paper presents an original analysis of two distinct sentencing 
guidelines from (1) Minnesota and (2) England and Wales, theorising how their content 
might interact with heuristics so as to exacerbate or mitigate clustering. It concludes by 
considering how µQXGJH WKHRU\¶ 7KDOHU and Sunstein, 2009) could assist those who 
design sentencing guidelines to promote individualisation. Ultimately, we argue that, in 
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order to reduce the effects of heuristics on the sentencing process, policymakers should 
more strategically organise the environment in which judges make sentencing decisions. 
 
 
2. Heuristics, sentencing and sentence clustering 
 
Our ability to engage in rational decision-making is constrained by the parameters 
of our cognition. As Shah and Oppenheimer (2008: 207) argue, humans µdo not have 
unlimited processing capacity.¶5DWKHU our rationality is µERXQGHG¶6LPRQE\RXU
capacities to acknowledge and retain information, and to interpret and weight impartially 
the information which we do identify. We also tend to suppress doubt, neglect ambiguity, 
and accept or reject information depending on whether it conforms with our current 
beliefs (Kahneman, 2011). Essentially, we µjump to conclusions¶ DQGXVHµUXOHVRIWKXPE¶
when making decisions, without fully and fairly processesing all of the relevant, available 
information. These limitations of our processing abilities are exacerbated by our tendency 
to underestimate the likelihood that our decisions are based on imperfect cognition 
(Kahneman, 2011).  
The consequences of this µERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\¶DUHRIWHQPLQRULQVRIDUDVmost 
of the decisions that we make in our day-to-day lives are relatively inconsequential 
(Simon, 1990). As key gatekeepers to (criminal) justice, however, sentencers make 
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decisions in their working lives which have significant, long-term implictions for 
offenders and victims, their families and wider society (Lipsky, 2010). It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider how these cognitive constraints might make it more or less likely 
that the goals and principles of sentencing will be realised in practice. 
This paper focuses on how heuristics might cause or exacerbate the phenomenon 
of sentence clustering. Assuming that no two criminal cases are exactly alike, a perfectly 
individualised sentencing process would result in a smooth continuum of sentences which 
reflect all the nuances and differences between the cases brought before the court. Instead, 
sentencing data tends to suggest that a small number of specific sentences are given to a 
significant proportion of cases (Bottomley and Pease, 1986; Fitzmaurice and Pease, 1986; 
Roberts, et al., 2018). In a recent study of sentencing in England and Wales, for example, 
Roberts, et al (2018) found that just five sentences (one year; one and a half years; two 
years; six months; and eight months) accounted for around 40% of 6,743 assault cases 
sentenced to immediate custody in 2011; ten sentences accounted for over half (56%) of 
that sample. :KLOHLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRGHWHUPLQHREMHFWLYHO\KRZPXFKFOXVWHULQJLVµWRR
PXFK¶WKHJURZLQJ LPSRUWDQFHSODFHGRQLQGLYLGXDOLVHGVHQWHQFLQJHJ%HUU\
means that these levels of clustering warrant further attention. Sentence clustering is 
antithetical to individualisation: the more clustering we observe, the less likely it is that 
sentence outcomes reflect the unique nature of each case or are proportionate, relative to 
each other (Berry, 2016; Roberts, et al., 2018). In other words, the presence of sentence 
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clustering may signify that varying levels of harm and culpability are being treated as 
equivalent by the courts. 
:HFDQWXUQWR6KDKDQG2SSHUQKHLPHU¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIKHXULVWLFV(2008) 
in order to consider how they might contribute to this phenomenon. They define heuristics 
as cognitive shortcuts which reduce the amount of time and effort required in coming to 
a conclusion. These shortcuts include: failing to identify or acknowledge all of the 
relevant information; failing to store or recall information; weighting competing 
information arbitrarily; excluding relevant information when forming an overall 
impression of the alternatives; and examining only a subset of the potential decision 
options (see also Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). According to Gilovic, et al. (2002), 
understanding decision-making in any context requires an acknowledgement of the role 
played by heuristics. Yet, in criminal justice, we often examine (and are quick to criticise) 
practitionerV¶ decision-making without reflecting on the cognitive biases which structure 
their thinking. For example, we discuss racial and social profiling by the police without 
reference to the innate human propensity to make prejudicial assumptions based on the 
social-psychological processes of stereotype formation ± what Smith and Alpert refer to 
as the µillusory FRUUHODWLRQSKHQRPHQRQ¶ (2007: 1273). The same is true in debates on 
sentencing, in which VHQWHQFHUV¶decision-making is appraised and policies introduced to 
structure their discretion, without fully considering the underlying cognitive processes 
which structure their thinking (Dhami, 2013b). 
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We can easily theorise how heuristics might shape sentencing in ways which 
contribute to clustering. Consider, for example, the tendencies to take into account less 
information than is available and relevant, to forget some of the information which was 
initially selected for processing, and to weigh up fewer decision options than exist. In 
Shah DQG 2SSHQKHLPHU¶V ZRUGV  -12), these heuristics might mean that 
sentencers use µRQO\DVPDOOVXEVHWRIWKHDYDLODEOHLQIRUPDWLRQZKHQPDNLQJMXGJPHQWV¶
and µH[DPLQHRUFRPSDUHIHZHUDOWHUQDWLYHV¶WKDQH[LVW when selecting the outcome. As 
a result, clustering might occur or be exacerbated ± and individiualisation might suffer ± 
if differentiating circumstances of criminal cases are neglected or forgotten by sentencers 
and/or if some sentencing options are overlooked or rejected without due consideration 
as to their applicability. 
The literature which applies heuristics to court decisions further illustrates how 
heuristics might cause or exacerbate sentence clustering. Several studies, for example, 
found that judges seldom identify and remember all the information which makes cases 
distinct. Dhami and Ayton (2001) observed that bail decisions often omit relevant factors, 
while Arce, et al. (2001) suggest that sentence disparities in similar cases might be 
attributed to differences in judJHV¶ (in)abilities to encode, store and retrieve all the 
relevant information. Von Helversen and Rieskamp (2009) found that prosecutors also 
consider only a small subset of the legally relevant and important factors when 
recommending sentences, arguing that their cognitive constraints might help explain why 
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important factors are often overlooked. The point is that judges likely fail to identify or 
remember all of the differentiating factors in each case, limiting their ability to distinguish 
between cases during sentencing and increasing the chances of differing cases incurring 
the same sentence outcome. 
Peer and Gamliel (2013: 118) note that sentencing might also be shaped by 
KHXULVWLFVEHFDXVHRIµWKHGRPLQDQWHIIHFWRIDQFKRULQJ¶$QFKRULQJLVa type of heuristic 
in which decision-makers consider fewer outcome alternatives than exist, as their thinking 
becomes µDQFKRUHG¶DURXQGDYDOXHZLWKZKLFKWKH\DUHSUHVHQted (Mussweiler, et al., 
2004). This value becomes an initial estimate which decision-PDNHUV WKHQ µDGMXVW¶ LQ
order to find an acceptable outcome (Saks and Kidd, 1980). Anchoring is one of the most 
robustly studied and influential biases on numerical decision-making (Kahneman, 2011; 
Mussweiler, et al., 2004), and research suggests that it impacts judicial decisions. For 
example, Englich and Mussweiler (2001) found that experienced judges gave wildly 
different sentences to similar cases, depending on the sentence requested by prosecutors. 
Another study found that judges were µDQFKRUHG¶E\MRXUQDOLVWV¶suggestions despite their 
legal irrelevance (Englich, et al., 2006), while Guthrie, et al. (2001) found that civil courts 
gave significantly lower damage awaUGVZKHQDQFKRUHGE\DGHIHQGDQW¶VPRWLRQ to do 
so. Thus, if judges were exposed to a consistent anchor in the sentencing process, we 
might expect this to contribute to clustering: the anchor would become the initial estimate 
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which judges then adjust to determine the sentence in each case. As we shall see later, the 
starting points provided in sentence guidelines could act to trigger this heuristic. 
We might expect judges to be skilled at identifying and remembering relevant 
factors and assessing varying outcomes for their applicability. After all, it is precisely this 
µDUW¶ in which they are trained, and on which fair sentencing depends. Still, heuristics 
seem likely to influence sentencing in ways which limit the MXGJHV¶DELOLW\WRdifferentiate 
between cases. The stronger the influence of these heuristics on sentencing decisions, the 
more generic and uniform we might expect sentences to be (Alschuler, 2005). Conversely, 
the more we can reduce the influence of heuristics on sentencing decisions, then the more 
case characteristics and outcomes which judges might consider, and the more likely it 
should be that sentences come to reflect the unique features of each case, occasioning 
more individualised sentencing. To consider this subject further, we now explore the role 
which sentencing guidelines play in shaping sentencing decisions, before theorising how 
they might act to exacerbate or mitigate the cognitive barriers to individualisation. 
 
 
3. Sentencing guidelines as choice architecture 
 
For decades, empirical research from the decision sciences has shown how the 
environment in which decisions are made, interacts with heuristics and other cognitive 
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biases to shape those decisions. This research was summarised by Richard Thaler and his 
colleagues who coined WKH WHUP µFKRLFHDUFKLWHFWXUH¶ WR UHIHU WRWKH µFRQWH[W LQZKLFK
people make decisions¶7KDOHUDQG6XQVWHLQVHHDOVR7KDOHUHWDO. They 
also used WKHWHUPµFKRLFHDUFKLWHFWV¶in reference to the people who organise or design 
that context, and who therefore shape decision making. Importantly, Thaler and Sunstein 
(2009) argued that there is no neutral way to design choice architecture: environments 
necessarily influence decision making, irrespective of whether they are designed with any 
consideration as to their effects. 
 The choice architecture of sentencing includes a range of more or less tangible 
features, including the time pressures and legislative and precedential frameworks under 
which judges operate, and the representations from those involved in arguing cases, inter 
alia. We would also argue that, in jurisdictions where judges are compelled or expected 
to use sentencing guidelines to guide their decision making, these guidelines are part of 
the sentencing choice architecture. Given that sentencing guidelines are now proliferating 
around the world (Roberts, et al., 2018), therefore, it is important to consider how their 
interaction with heuristics might shape sentencing decisions. 
Here, we investigate the potential interaction between heuristics and guidelines in 
two jurisdictions: (1) Minnesota and (2) England and Wales. These jurisdictions are the 
subject of recent research in this field (see, for example, Roberts, et al., 2018) for three 
reasons: a) their different guideline models are used to exemplify distinct approaches to 
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guideline design (Reitz, 2013); b) they are, as common law jurisdictions in the Anglo-
American world, reasonably comparable; and c) they both publish enough numerical data 
to enable advanced quantitative analysis on sentencing outcomes. 
In both Minnesota and England and Wales, guidelines are central to the sentencing 
process. Minnesota was the first American State to create legally binding guidelines 
which have since served as a model for several other States, including Pennsylvania and 
Oregon (Frase, 2005). 7KH\DUHGHVLJQHGLQDµgrid' format: a two-dimensional structure, 
with crime seriousness along one axis (composed of eleven levels), and criminal history 
along the other (composed of seven levels). All offences must be assigned to one of the 
eleven offence seriousness levels, before the offender is JLYHQDµ&ULPLQDO+LVWRU\6FRUH¶
UXQQLQJ IURP µ¶ WR µRU PRUH¶ GHSHQGLQJRQ their prior convictions. The grid then 
provides either a presumptive stayed (i.e. suspended) sentence (for less serious offences) 
or a starting point and sentencing range at the intersection of each row and column (for 
more serious offences and recidivists). For example, a conviction for a seriousness level-
six offence by an offender with a category-three criminal history, results in a 34- to 46-
month term of imprisonment (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2016); the 
same offence by an offender without a criminal record would only attract a 21-month 
suspended sentence. Importantly, the guidelines are mandatory and sentencers can only 
deviate from the prescribed ranges if µVXEVWDQWLDO DQG FRPSHOOLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFHV [are] 
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LGHQWLILHGDQGDUWLFXODWHG¶DVWRZK\WKH\must do so (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission, 2016: 2).  
Guidelines in England and Wales, in contrast, are offence-specific. The first 
definitive sentencing guidelines came into force in 2007, addressed offences of assault 
and consisted primarily of narrative text (Ashworth and Roberts, 2013). In 2011, the 
Sentencing Council replaced the original assault guidelines with a new design, requiring 
sentencers to follow a series of structured steps (Dhami, 2013a, 2013b). This new format 
was used to revise all previous guidelines and has been used for all subsequent sentencing 
guidelines. Guidelines have since been issued for several further offences, including 
burglary, sexual and drug offences. At the time of writing, the most recently published 
guidelines relate to offences of manslaughter and child cruelty.1 It is this most recent 
µVWUXFWXUHGVWHSV¶IRUPDWRIEngland and Wales guideline to which this article refers.  
Each sentencing guideline in England and Wales is subdivided into several 
specific offences.2 Specific offences are then divided into three or four categories of 
seriousness, each of which is associated with its own starting point sentence and range. 
Judges determine the category by identifying and weighting factors relating to harm and 
culpability from an exhaustive list. For the offence of common assault, for example, 
                                                 
1
 See https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/?s&cat=definitive-guideline to access all of the 
published sentencing guidelines in England and Wales.  
2
 For example, the assault guidelines cover: causing grievous bodily harm with intent; inflicting grievous 
bodily harm; assault occasioning actual bodily harm; assault with intent to resist arrest; assault on a police 
constable; and common assault.  
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eighteen such factors are listed, including Dµsignificant degree of premeditation¶ and a 
µleading role in group or gang¶ (Sentencing Council, 2011: 24). Sentencers must then 
follow a series of structured steps (for common assault, there are nine in total) which 
require them to consider an array of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any 
assistance which the offender provided the prosecution, reductions for guilty pleas and 
the totality principle, inter alia, when determining the final sentence.  
The design of the England and Wales guidelines was influenced by the desire to 
structure the discretion of sentencers, while allowing for more judicial discretion than 
their American counterparts (Ashworth and Roberts, 2013). The law in England and 
Wales states that sentencing guidelines must be followed: Section 125(1) of the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 declares that all sentencers must µfollow any sentencing guidelines 
ZKLFKDUHUHOHYDQWWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VFDVH>«@unless the court is satisfied that it would be 
contrary to the interests of justice to do so¶. Some commentators maintain that this 
legislation, when read alongside the step-structure format of the England and Wales 
guidelines, creates both a binding duty on the courts to follow the guidelines and an 
expectation that they will do so in practice (e.g. Roberts and Ashworth, 2015; Roberts 
and Bradford, 2015). According to Dhami (2013b), however, WKHWHUPµIROORZ¶LVflexible 
enough that this law falls short of making the guidelines mandatory. Either way, as Dhami 
(2013a, 2013b) points out, the guidelines provide sentencers with considerable freedom 
to select and weight different factors as they see fit. 
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At this stage, it is useful to consider the empirical research on the different ways 
in which the sentencing guidelines are µIROORZHG¶, as this term could denote adherence to 
either the outcomes or the processes outlined therein. This is important for our purposes 
because, the more evidence there is that the guidelines are followed by sentencers, then 
the more confidently we can state that they form a key part of the choice architecture of 
sentencing.  
In relation to outcomes, adherence can be determined by measuring the proportion 
of cases in which sentences fall within or outside of the specified ranges. Minnesota 
provides UHJXODUUHSRUWVRQµGHSDUWXUHUDWHV¶, most recently finding that, in the year 2016, 
around three-quarters of felony sentences fell within the guidelineV¶UDQJHV (Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2017). A study in England and Wales (Roberts, 
2013) found that, in 97% of cases of two assault offences, and in 92% of cases of another 
assault offence, sentences complied with the ranges provided in the guidelines. In 
addition, research from England and Wales suggest that discounts given for guilty pleas 
typically correspond with those mandated within the relevant guidelines (Roberts, 2013; 
Roberts and Bradford, 2015), suggesting that sentencers may make these decisions with 
reference to, or based on their knowledge of, the requirements therein. It is worth bearing 
in mind that low departure rates do not necessarily indicate an optimal sentencing process: 
low departure rates could conincide with high levels of clustering, for example, if judges 
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use only a small number of sentencing outcomes (albeit, ones which fell within the 
predetermined ranges for each offence). 
Furthermore, although the low departure rates may indicate that judges largely 
adhere to prescribed outcomes, they do not necessarily mean that the outlined procedures 
are being followed in every case. With reference to the structured steps in the England 
and Wales guidelines, Roberts (2013: 111) notes that departure rates µGRQRWUHYHDOWKH
extent to which [judges] haYH³IROORZHG´WKHJXLGHOLQHVLQWHUPVRIPRYLQJWKURXJKWKH
QLQH VWHSV WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW WKH DSSURSULDWH IDFWRUV DW WKH DSSURSULDWH VWDJH¶ He 
concludes that, in the absence of research which examines exactly how and when judges 
engage with guidelines GXULQJVHQWHQFLQJµWKHIXOOLPSDFWRIWKHJXLGHOLQHVDQGWKHZD\
WKDWFRXUWVXVHWKHPUHPDLQVKLGGHQIURPYLHZ¶5REHUWV  
The most recent evidence from England and Wales suggests that sentencers might 
indeed be following the processes outlined in the guidelines. For example, Pina-Sánchez 
(2015) and Pina-Sánchez and Linacre (2014) found that sentencing consistency increased 
following a reformatting of the guidelines which explicitly sought to achieve this goal. 
The new format provides a much longer and clearer list of aggravating and mitigating 
factors than its predecessor, corresponding with findings by Roberts, et al. (2018) that 
sentencers reported taking more factors into account after this change was introduced. 
Roberts, et al. (2018) also found that, for offences of assault, clustering had decreased 
under the new guidelines, as measured by the proportion of offenders sentenced to the ten 
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or twenty most common outcomes. As the next section argues, we might expect to see 
lower clustering when multiple factors are listed in the guidelines, if judges refer back to 
them during sentencing. Further studies have also found that, as the England and Wales 
guidelines require, sentencers generally give more weight to µStep One¶IDFWRUVLHWKRVH
indicating seriousness) than to the additional aggravating and mitigating factors provided 
LQµStep Two¶)OHHWZRRGHWDO,UZLQ-Rogers and Perry, 2015; Lightowlers and 
Pina-Sánchez, 2017; Maslen, 2015; Pina-Sánchez and Grech, 2018). More recently, Pina-
Sánchez, et al. (under review) found evidence that judges generally follow the step-
sequence in the order prescribed within the guidelines. Specficially, they found that, for 
the most part, the case characteristics listed in Steps Two and Four of the guidelines were 
being used as originally intended.  
There are further reasons that we might expect judges to engage with the 
guidelines. In Minnesota, the multitude of options presented on the grid may mean that 
judges, unless they are able to memorise all the calculations contained therein, must 
consult the guidelines regularly if they wish to ensure that their decisions are compliant. 
Judges in England and Wales might also need to refer back to the guidelines during 
sentencing in order to decide on the initial category of seriousness, consider each of the 
structured steps and reflect on the lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances when 
determining the sentence ± especially as these vary for the different offences. In both 
jurisdictions, moreover, sentencers are trained to follow the guidelines. In England and 
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Wales, the progressive introduction of new guidelines is accompanied by judicial training 
in their use (Roberts and Ashworth, 2015), meaning that, even if sentencers do not always 
consult the guidelines during VHQWHQFLQJWKH\VKRXOGEHDZDUHRIWKHJXLGHOLQHV¶GHWDLOV
and their own obligations therein. Finally, the fact that magistrates are not legally trained, 
need only sit a minimum of thirteen days per year, and tend not to oversee a large volume 
or variety of cases, might mean that they are unfamiliar with some offences¶JXLGHOLQHV, 
and are therefore more likely to refer back to them for direction on a regular basis (Roberts 
and Ashworth, 2015). Given that magistrates tend to sentence around 95% of cases in the 
criminal courts (Office for National Statistics, 2017), this would mean that the guidelines 
play a significant role in shaping sentencing decisions in this jurisdiction. 
 Sentencing guidelines may not always be utilised or followed to the letter (or 
number). Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that guidelines matter : where in force, 
they are an important part of the choice architecture in which sentencing takes place. 
Given the influence of choice architecture over how people make decisions (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009), therefore, researchers must seek to assess both the likely interaction 
between heuristics and sentencing guidelines, and the implications of this relationship for 
achieving the goals of sentencing. We will now analyse two different guidelines in order 
to hypothesise how their design might intensify or reduce the influence of heuristics on 
sentencing, focusing on the implications for clustering and individualisation. 
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4. Analysing the architecture of sentencing guidelines 
 
5HVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDWMXGJHV¶Keuristics might contribute to sentence clustering 
by preventing them from identifying and recalling all the relevant circumstances of the 
offence and offender and all the potentially applicable sentencing options. As a feature of 
the choice architecture which contextualises the sentencing decision, we should expect 
that sentencing guidelines interact with MXGJHV¶heuristics in ways which strengthen or 
reduce these tendencies, depending on how the guidelines are designed.  
In Minnesota, the standard sentencing grid3 can be found on page 79 of the 146-
page Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission, 2016). Already, this design is problematic, if the designers sought to ensure 
adherence to the full detail of the guidelines: the decision sciences literature suggests that 
any guidance which is lengthy, convoluted and heaving with text and detail is unlikely to 
be fully utilised (Dhami, 2013a, 2013b; Hutton, 2013; Ruback and Wroblewski, 2001). 
Still, we can study the sentencing grid itself, as it is this feature of the document to which 
Minnesotan judges are most likely to refer when sentencing (Frase, 2005). 
7KHJULG¶VGHVLJQUHTXLUHVMXGJHVWRXQGHUWDNHWKUHHVWHSV7KHILUVWDQGVHFRQG
steps, as described above, are to determine the crime seriousness and the criminal history 
                                                 
3
 The guidelines provide separate grids for sexual offences (p.81) and drug offences (p.83). 
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score, from which it is possible to identify the category into which each offence falls. The 
judges must then determine the final sentence based on the starting points and, in some 
cases, ranges provided in each offence category. There are no lists of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances supplied next to the grid, nor any other explicit reminder or 
encouragement to individualise sentences. 
An analysis of the Minnesota sentencing grid indicates that four of its features 
may act to exacerbate sentence clustering: 
 
1) The first and second steps require judges to consider only the offence¶V severity 
and WKHRIIHQGHU¶Vcriminal history. Judges are therefore precluded (or, at least, 
discouraged) from taking other factors into account at this point (Frase, 2005). 
2) The grid comprises a total of 77 offence categories, representing all the possible 
combinations of offence seriousness and criminal history.  
3) 48 (62.3%) of these categories denote both starting points and sentence ranges; 
the remaining 29 (37.7%) categories relate to presumptive stayed sentences and 
only provide starting points. 
4) The grid neither reminds nor encourages judges to consider aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances when determining whether, or by how much, the final 
sentence should deviate from the starting point. 
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These features of the grid might exacerbate clustering by preventing, discouraging or 
failing to remind or encourage judges to take multiple factors into account and consider 
the full range of sentencing options. First of all, judges are required only to consider two 
factors when selecting the category on which the sentence largely depends. Consequently, 
hundreds of offences are shoehorned into eleven groups and thousands of offenders are 
placed within just 77 categories, meaning that offences of varying seriousness and 
offenders of differing culpability will likely be assigned to the same categories. This is a 
common criticism of grid-based sentencing guidelines (Alschuler, 1991; Lowenthal, 
1993; Schulhofer, 1991) and means that their design may exacerbate the tendency to 
exclude potentially relevant factors during sentencing.  
Moreover, the grid does not encourage judges to consider the full range of 
sentencing outcomes. Firstly, we might expect that starting points, present in all 77 
categories, will anchor the MXGJHV¶WKLQNLQJrisking uniform sentences that have not been 
reasoned exclusively according to the principles of sentencing (Isaacs, 2011). Secondly, 
although sentence ranges are provided directly underneath the starting point in two-thirds 
of offence categories (i.e. those representing immediate custody), the grid provides no 
incentives or reminders to adjust the starting point, and no aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances which judges could use to help them do so. The guidelines do provide a 
list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which judges may use as reasons to 
depart from the predetermined ranges. Yet, this list is located some distance from the grid 
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(pp. 45-49), is woven inconspicuously into the narrative text which constitutes the bulk 
of the document and does not apply to the majority of cases that are sentenced within the 
ranges provided. These features of the Minnesota grid may compound the tendency to 
consider fewer factors and outcomes than are relevant and available, respectively. 
As noted earlier, the England and Wales guidelines were developed with the 
express intention of affording judges more discretion than their Minnesotan counterparts 
(Sentencing Commission Working Group, 2008). Consequently, they diverge from those 
in Minnesota in several important ways, most notably by delineating a series of structured 
steps which sentencers must follow, but which are less prescriptive than the grid.  
An analysis of one representative example of the England and Wales guidelines 
(the Assault Definitive Guideline [Sentencing Council, 2011]) suggests four ways that it 
may be more likely than the Minnesotan grid to mitigate for the impact of heuristics on 
the sentencing process: 
 
1) It lists several aggravating and mitigating factors which judges are encouraged 
to consider during the first step (i.e. when an offence category is determined). 
This is divided into factors relating to harm and to culpability. For example, 
for the offence of common assault, the guidelines list three factors indicating 
higher harm and one indicating lower harm, as well as nine factors indicating 
higher culpability and five indicating lower culpability.  
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2) All offence categories provide both starting points and ranges. For example, 
the starting point for a cateJRU\ RQH FRPPRQ DVVDXOW LV D µ+LJK OHYHO
FRPPXQLW\RUGHU¶ZKLOHWKHUDQJHLVVSHFLILHGDVµ/RZOHYHOFRPPXQLW\RUGHU
± ZHHNV¶FXVWRG\¶6HQWHQFLQJ&RXQFLO 
3) ,Q µ6WHS-7ZR¶, once a category is determined, judges are encouraged to 
consider a long list of potentially relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. 
Sentencers are asked to µLGHQWLI\ZKHWKHUDQ\FRPELQDWLRQRIWKHVHRURWKHU
relevant factors, should result in an upward or downward adjustment from the 
VWDUWLQJ SRLQW¶ (Sentencing Council, 2011: 25). The factors listed vary for 
different offences. For common assault, for example, nineteen aggravating 
factors and eleven mitigating factors are listed; it is also stated that this list is 
µnon-exhaustive¶HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
4) Following these two steps, judges are required to adjust the sentence in 
accordance with several further explicitly stated considerations, including any 
assistance the offender provided to the prosecution, reductions for a guilty 
plea, and dangerousness, inter alia. 
 
In theory, these features of the England and Wales guidelines should act either to mitigate 
for the influence of heuristics on sentencing or, at least, exacerbate it to a lesser degree 
than the Minnesotan grid. For example, sentence ranges are detailed in every case where 
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a starting point is provided, reminding judges that they can deviate from the starting point. 
Moreover, sentencers who refer to these guidelines will encounter dozens of factors to 
consider when selecting the offence category and deciding whether and by how much to 
depart from starting points, potentially encouraging or reminding them to take multiple 
factors into account. They are even reminded, in bold, that there may be unwritten, 
relevant factors which they should consider. These design features could help sentencers 
to identify and recall more of the pertinent circumstances and consider more sentence 
outcomes, relative to the Minnesotan grid. This hypothesis is consistent with Shah and 
2SSHQKHLPHU¶Vbelief that decision-makers can be encouraged to identify and make use 
of additional information which is µprocessed from an external source¶ (2008: 207) ± to 
put it simply, if they are reminded and encouraged to do so.  
This is not to say that we should necessarily expect more clustering in Minnesota 
than in England and Wales, as many other factors may contribute to this phenomenon. 
For example, levels of clustering may in part be a product of the training, culture or 
composition of the judiciaries. Additionally, the starting points in England and Wales will 
still act to anchor MXGJHV¶WKLQNLQg and may even be more likely to occasion sentence 
clustering than those in Minnesota. In England and Wales, starting points for terms of 
imprisonment are almost always expressed in whole years or in multiples of three months. 
7KLV PLJKW HQFRXUDJH VHQWHQFHUV WR XVH FHUWDLQ µURXQG¶ QXPEHUV (e.g. six, twelve or 
eighteen months) to a greater degree than the Minnesotan guidelines, in which both the 
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starting points and the sentence ranges are always expressed in months, and in which 
numbers of months which do not represent full, half or quarter years are commonly used.4 
If anchoring is indeed the most influential heuristic, we might expect to find more 
clustering overall in in England and Wales than in Minnesota, despite the various other 
differences between the guidelines. Anchoring caused by starting points and sentence 
ranges might also help to explain the finding by Roberts, et al. (2018) that sentencers in 
(QJODQGDQG:DOHVSUHIHUFHUWDLQµURXQG¶QXPEHUV 
Having illustrated how the interaction between heuristics and sentencing 
guidelines might impact on clustering, wHFDQQRZWXUQWRµQXGJHWKHRU\¶WRconsider how 
evidence from the decision sciences might be used to enhance individualisation and other 
sentencing goals. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: nudging judges through sentencing guidelines? 
 
                                                 
4
 Of the 48 (out of 77) categories in the Minnesota standard grid which have both starting points and 
sentence ranges, only six provide a starting point and sentence range which both represent either full, half 
or quarter years. For example, the category for someone who commits murder in the second or third 
degree and has six or more previous offences provides a starting point of 240 months (12 years) and a 
range of 204 months (17 years) to 288 months (24 years). Starting points and/or sentence ranges in the 
remaining 42 categories all include numbers of months which are not divisible by three. For example, the 
category for a 1st degree assault committed by someone with no previous convictions provides a starting 
point of 86 months and a range of 74 to 103 months. 
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More empirical research is required before we can conclude exactly how and to 
what degree heuristics influence sentencing. To the extent that heuristics seem likely to 
contribute to sentence clustering, however, it is worth exploring whether µQXGJHWKHRU\¶
may help the µFKRLFH DUFKLWHFWV¶ who design sentencing guidelines to achieve greater 
individualisation in sentencing. Nudge theory posits that choice architecture can be 
designed in a manner which reduces the negative influence of heuristics on decision 
making, without restricting the choices available to decision makers (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009). This could be useful in the context of sentencing, where judges often resist efforts 
to constrain their discretion (Dhami, 2013a), but where it is nonetheless important to 
structure their decision making to maximise the chances that the goals of sentencing are 
realised. Nudge theory could help policymakers to design sentencing guidelines which 
improve decision quality, without prompting the resistance associated with compulsory, 
restrictive or prescriptive measures. 
It is possible to conceptualise some of the existing features of the England and 
Wales guidelines as nudges. For example, both the lists of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and the notice that these lists are not exhaustive, could remind sentencers 
to consider more relevant factors. This, in turn, might help judges to individualise 
sentences, without policymakers being prescriptive in terms of which factors should be 
considered and how they should be weighted. These design features might help explain 
both the decrease in clustering and the increase in the number of factors which judges 
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reported considering, after this new model of guidelines was introduced in England and 
Wales (Roberts, et al., 2018). Nudges might also help to encourage more proportionate 
sentencing. Fleetwood et al. (2015) examined the impact of new drug offence guidelines 
in England and Wales which urge judges to link the culpability of drug traffickers to their 
µUROH¶LQWKHSURFHVV7KHLUDQDO\VLVIRXQGthat this change precipitated a fall in sentence 
lengths for offenders who had been coerced or pressured into trafficking. Future research 
must seek to establish empirically the manner and extent to which judges follow to the 
offence-specific (and, for that matter, the generic5) guidelines in order to help determine 
whether provisions such as this can influence sentencing in practice. 
Future studies could also experiment with different kinds of nudges in order to 
promote almost any goal which we might wish sentencing to achieve. For example, they 
could be used to promote a greater emphasis on evidence-based sentencing (Lösel, 2012; 
Marcus, 2006). In the United States, where sentencing reform has gained bipartisan 
support in recent years (Karstedt, et al., 2018), guidelines could be used to nudge judges 
into greater use of non-custodial sentences. Researchers could make use of experimental 
methods and hypothetical cases to test the impact of different types of nudges on judicial 
decisions (Dhami, 2002; Dhami, et al., 2015). As nudge theory and the decision sciences 
become increasingly influential across public policy circles, criminologists may wish to 
                                                 
5
 England and Wales has sentencing guidelines which are not offence specific, but which outline 
principles for the sentencing of young people, for the imposition of community and custodial sentences 
and for assessing sentence reductions for guilty pleas, inter alia. 
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consider how the knowledge located in these fields might help us to achieve hitherto 
intractable problems in our own work. 
It may be that judges can be nudged into undertaking a more analytical process 
than the more intuitive one which might otherwise occur (Kahneman, 2011; Krasnostein 
and Freiber, 2013). This is not to say that sentencing operates on intuition alone; Dhami, 
et al. (2015) have argued that sentencing is DµTXDVLUDWLRQDO¶SURFHVVORFDWHGVRPHZKHUH
in between intuition and analysis. Nor is it to suggest that heuristics and intuition are 
LQKHUHQWO\µLUUDWLRQDO¶RUOHDGDOZD\VWRLQFRUUHFWGHFLVLRQV$OLVRQHWDO 2011). Rather, 
it is to recognise that the use of intuition and the influence of heuristics in sentencing 
might make this process insufficiently precise to achieve individualisation (Casey, et al., 
2013; Peer and Gamliel, 2013). Research has long established that practitioners in public 
institutions tend to over-simplify complex situations and humanV¶ needs, when deciding 
how to use their powers to administer benefits and sanctions (Lipsky, 2010; McConville, 
et al., 1991). This results in decisions which systematically and predictably fail to respond 
to the unique nature of individual cases (Sunstein, et al., 2002). Given the proliferation of 
sentencing guidelines around the world, we concur with Dhami (2013a, 2013b): we must 
turn to evidence from the decision sciences to ensure that guidelines are always designed 
in ways which promote important sentencing goals. 
 
29 
 
Bibliography 
Alison L, Barrett E and Almond L (2011) The interpretation and utilisation of offender 
profiles: a critical review of 'traditional' approaches to profiling. In: Adler J and Gray J 
(eds) Forensic Psychology: Concepts, Debates and Practice. Abingdon: Routledge, 
pp.38-57. 
Alschuler A (1991) The failure of sentencing guidelines: a plea for less aggregation. 
University of Chicago Law Review 58(3): 901-951. 
Alschuler A (2005) Disparity: the normative and empirical failure of the federal 
guidelines. Standford Law Review 58(1): 85-117. 
Arce R, Farina F, Novo M and Seijo D (2001) Judges' decision-making from within. In: 
Roesch R, Corrado R and Dempster R (eds) Psychology in the Court: International 
Advances with Knowledge. New York City: Routledge, pp.195-206. 
Ashworth A (2015) Sentencing and Criminal Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ashworth A and Roberts J (2013). The origins and evolution of sentencing guidelines in 
England and Wales. In: Ashworth A and Roberts J (eds) Sentencing Guidelines: 
Exploring the English Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.16-29. 
Berry W (2016) 5HPHPEHULQJ)XUPDQ¶Vcomparative proportionality: a response to 
Smith and Staihar. Iowa Law Review 65(1): 65-73. 
30 
 
Bottomley K and Pease K (1986). Crime and Punishment: Interpreting the Data. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Casey P, Burke K and Leben S (2013) Minding the court: enhancing the decision-
making process. International Journal for Court Administration 5(1): 45±54. 
Dhami M (2002) Do bail information schemes really affect bail decisions? The Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice 41(3): 245±262. 
Dhami M (2013a) Sentencing guidelines in England and Wales: missed opportunities? 
Law and Contemporary Problems 76(1): 289-307. 
Dhami M (2013b) A `decision sFLHQFH¶perspective on the old and new sentencing 
guidelines in England and Wales. In: Ashworth A and Roberts J (eds) Sentencing 
Guidelines: Exploring the English Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.165-181. 
Dhami M and Ayton P (2001) Bailing and jailing the fast and frugal way. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making 14(2): 141-168. 
Dhami M, Belton A and Goodman-Delahunty J (2015) Quasirational models of 
sentencing. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 4(3): 239-247. 
Englich B and Mussweiler T (2001) Sentencing under uncertainty: anchoring effects in 
the courtroom. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 31(7): 1535-1551. 
Englich B, Mussweiler T and Strack F (2006) Playing dice with criminal sentences: the 
influence of irrelevant anchors on e[SHUWV¶judicial decision making. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin 32(2): 188-200. 
31 
 
Fitzmaurice C and Pease K (1986) The Psychology of Judicial Sentencing. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Fleetwood J, Radcliffe P and Stevens A (2015) Shorter sentences for drug mules: the 
early impact of the sentencing guidelines in England and Wales. Drugs: Education, 
Prevention and Policy 22(5): 428-436. 
Frase R (2005) Sentencing guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003. Crime and Justice 32: 
131-219. 
Gigerenzer G and Gaissmaier W (2011) Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of 
Psychology 62(1): 451-482. 
Gilovic T, Griffin D and Kahneman D (eds) (2002) Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Guthrie C, Rachlinski J and Wistrich A (2001) Inside the judicial mind. Cornell Law 
Review 86(4): 777-830. 
Hutton N (2013) The definitive guideline on assault offences: the performance of 
justice. In: Ashworth A and Roberts J (eds) Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the 
English Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.86-103. 
Irwin-Rogers K and Perry T (2015) Exploring the impact of sentencing factors on 
sentencing domestic burglary. In: Roberts J (ed) Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring 
Sentencing Practice in England and Wales. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.213-239. 
32 
 
Isaacs D (2011) Baseline framing in sentencing. The Yale Law Journal 121(2): 428-
458. 
Jones C and Rankin M (2015) Justice as a rounding error: evidence of subconscious 
bias in second degree murder sentences in Canada. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 52(1): 
109-140 
Kahneman D (2011) Thinking Fast and Slow. London: Penguin. 
Karstedt S, Bergin T and Koch M (2018) Critical junctures and conditions of change: 
exploring the fall of prison populations in US States. Social and Legal Studies. Epub 
ahead of print 11 January 2018. DOI: 10.1177/0964663917747342. 
Krasnostein S and Freiberg A (2013) Pursuing consistency in an individualistic 
sentencing framework: if you know where you're going, how do you know when you've 
got there?. Law and Contemporary Problems 76(1): 265-288. 
Lightowlers C and Pina-Sánchez J (2017) Intoxication and assault: an analysis of 
Crown Court sentencing practices in England and Wales. British Journal of Criminology 
58(1): 132±154. 
Lipsky M (2010) Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Service. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 
Lösel F (2012) What works in correctional treatment and rehabilitation for young 
adults? In: Lösel F and Farrington D (eds) Young Adult Offenders: Lost in Transition?. 
Abingdon: Routledge, pp.74-112. 
33 
 
Lowenthal G (1993) Mandatory sentencing laws: undermining the effectiveness of 
determinate sentencing reform. California Law Review 81(1): 61-123. 
Marcus M (2006) Smart Sentencing: Public Safety, Public Trust and Confidence 
through Evidence-based Dispositions. Available at: 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/161 (accessed 17 
June 2016). 
Maslen H (2015) Penitence and persistence: how should sentencing factors interact? 
In: Roberts J (ed) Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring Sentencing Practice in England 
and Wales. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.173-193. 
McConville M, Sanders A and Leng R (1991) The Case for the Prosecution. London: 
Routledge. 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (2016) Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines and Commentary. Available at: http://mn.gov/msgc-
stat/documents/2016%20Guidelines/2016%20MN%20Sentencing%20Guidelines%20a
nd%20Commentary.pdf (accessed 01 May 2018). 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (2017) 2016 Sentencing Practices: 
Annual Summary Statistics for Felony Offenders. Available at: 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2017/other/171185.pdf (accessed 01 May 2018). 
Mussweiler T, Englich B and Strack F (2004) Anchoring effect. In: Pohl R (ed) 
Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgment and 
Memory. Hove: Psychology Press, pp.183-200. 
34 
 
Office for National Statistics (2017) Overview of crime and justice statistics. Available 
at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/methodologie
s/overviewofcrimeandjusticestatistics (accessed 01 May 2018). 
Peer E and Gamliel E (2013) Heuristics and biases in judicial decisions. Court Review 
49: 114-118. 
Pina-Sánchez J (2015) Defining and measuring consistency in sentencing. In: Roberts 
J (ed) Exploring Sentencing Practice in England and Wales. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp.76-92. 
Pina-Sánchez J and Linacre R (2014) Enhancing consistency in sentencing: exploring 
the effects of guidelines in England and Wales. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 
30(4): 731-748. 
Pina-Sánchez J, Brunton-Smith I and Guangquan L (under review) Mind the step: a 
more insightful and robust framework for the analysis of the sentencing process in 
England and Wales under the new sentencing guidelines. Criminology and Criminal 
Justice. 
Pina-Sánchez J and Grech D (2017) Location and sentencing: to what extent do 
contextual factors explain between court disparities? British Journal of Criminology 
58(3): 529-549. 
Reitz K (2013) Comparing sentencing guidelines: do US systems have anything 
worthwhile to offer England and Wales? In: Ashworth A and Roberts J (eds) 
35 
 
Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp.182-201. 
Roberts J (2011) Sentencing guidelines and judicial discretion: evolution of the duty of 
courts to comply in England and Wales. British Journal of Criminology 51(6): 997±
1013. 
Roberts J (2013) Complying with sentencing guidelines: latest findings from the Crown 
Court sentencing survey. In: Ashworth A and Roberts J (eds) Sentencing Guidelines: 
Exploring the English Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.104-121. 
Roberts J and Ashworth A (2015) The evolution of sentencing policy and practice in 
England and Wales, 2003±2015. Crime and Justice 45(1): 307-358. 
Roberts J and Bradford B (2015) Sentence reductions for a guilty plea in England and 
Wales: exploring new empirical trends. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 12(2): 187±
210. 
Roberts J, Pina-Sánchez J and Marder I (2018) Individualisation at sentencing: the 
effects of guidelines and 'preferred' numbers. Criminal Law Review 2: 123-136. 
Ruback R and Wroblewski J (2001) The federal sentencing guidelines: psychological 
and policy reasons for simplification. Psychology, Public Policy and Law 7(4) 739-775. 
Saks M and Kidd R (1980) Human information processing and adjudication: trial by 
heuristics. Law and Society Review 15(1): 123-160. 
36 
 
Schulhofer S (1991) Assessing the federal sentencing process: the problem is 
uniformity, not disparity. American Criminal Law Review 29(3): 833-873. 
Sentencing Commission Working Group (2008) Sentencing guidelines in England and 
Wales: an evolutionary approach. Sentencing Commision Working Group: London. 
Sentencing Council (2011) Assault: Definitive Guideline. Available at: 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Assault_definitive_guideline_-_Crown_Court.pdf (accessed 03 May 
2018). 
Shah A and Oppenheimer D (2008) Heuristics made easy: an effort-reduction 
framework. Psychological Bulletin 134(2): 207-222. 
Simon H (1990) Invariants of human behaviour. Annual Review of Psychology, 41(1): 
1-19. 
Smith M and Alpert G (2007) Explaining police bias: a theory of social conditioning and 
illusory correlation. Criminal Justice and Behaviour 34(10): 1262-1283. 
Sunstein C, Kahneman D, Ritov I and Schkade D (2002) Predictably incoherent 
judgments. Stanford Law Review 54: 1153-1216. 
Thaler R and Sunstein C (2009) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness. London: Penguin. 
37 
 
Thaler R, Sunstein C and Balz J (2013) Choice architecture. In: Shafir E (ed) The 
Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.428-
439. 
Von Helversen B and Rieskamp J (2009) Predicting sentences for low-level crimes: 
comparing models of human judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 
15(4): 375-395. 
  
 
